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OPINION
O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:
We must decide whether a disabled teacher is a “qualified 
individual with a disability” under the Americans with Dis­
abilities Act.
I
A
Patricia (“Trish”) Johnson, who had a history of depression 
and bipolar disorder, taught special education in the Boundary 
County School District No. 101 (“District”) in Idaho for a 
decade. In May 2007, Johnson entered into a standard teach­
ing contract with the District requiring her “to have and main­
tain the legal qualifications required to teach” special
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education during the 2007-2008 school year. In Idaho, 
“[e]very person who is employed to serve in any elementary 
school or secondary school in the capacity of teacher . . . shall 
be required to have and to hold a certificate issued under 
authority of the state board of education.” Idaho Code § 33­
1201. The Idaho State Board of Education (“ISBE”) issued 
Johnson a teaching certificate valid from september 1, 2002 
to september 1, 2007. Hence, Johnson's teaching certificate 
was set to expire around the start of the 2007-2008 school 
year.
To renew her certificate, Johnson was required to complete 
at least six semester hours of professional development train­
ing, at least three of which had to be for college credit, during 
the five-year period that her certificate was valid. Idaho 
Admin. Code § 08.02.02.060.03. During this period, Johnson 
completed a number of courses toward renewal of her certifi­
cate; however, by the summer of 2007, she was still short the 
required three semester hours of college credit. According to 
Johnson, she had taken “much more than just three hours” of 
college-level courses by the start of the summer but had not 
received any credit because she never paid for the courses.
However, during that summer Johnson experienced a major 
depressive episode that rendered her unable to take any col­
lege courses. Shortly before classes resumed in the fall, John­
son met with the District Superintendent, Dr. Don Bartling, 
and explained that her certificate would soon expire because 
she had failed to complete the three college credits. Superin­
tendent Bartling informed Johnson that she would need to 
petition the District’s Board of Trustees (“Board”) to apply 
for provisional authorization from the ISBE to teach without 
a certificate during the upcoming school year.
School districts in Idaho could apply for provisional autho­
rization to hire teachers who lacked the appropriate certifica­
tion by submitting a letter of request signed by the 
superintendent and chair of the board of trustees explaining
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the need for provisional authorization, “outlining the ‘good 
faith effort’ the district made in attempting to hire someone 
with appropriate certification,” and specifying the teacher’s 
qualifications. Upon ISBE approval, the teacher would be 
allowed to teach for a nonrenewable one-year term.
Johnson appeared before the Board on September 6, 2007, 
and requested that the Board apply for provisional authoriza­
tion for her to teach during the school year. The Board voted 
to deny the request. According to the Chairman of the Board, 
Melanie Staples, the reason for the denial was that Johnson 
“had five years to get those three credits and didn’t approach 
administration until just before school started where her cer­
tificate was up.” Staples testified that the Board applied for 
provisional authorizations only when there was an open posi­
tion but no certificated teachers available. Because there were 
two certificated special education teachers available to teach 
in the District, one of them was hired to fill in for Johnson.
The Board mailed a notice of possible nonrenewal of John­
son’s teaching contract for the 2007-2008 school year to 
Johnson on October 1, 2007. Two weeks later, the Board held 
a hearing to determine whether Johnson had violated the 
terms of her contract by allowing her teaching certification to 
lapse. Johnson was represented by counsel at the hearing and 
given the opportunity to testify and to present evidence. John­
son testified at length about her history of mental illness, as 
well as how her depressive episode during the summer of 
2007 had prevented her from completing the required college 
credits. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Board decided 
to “stand on [its] previous decision” not to seek provisional 
authorization because of “Ms. Johnson’s lack of action over 
the last five years.” Consequently, Johnson was terminated, 
and the substitute teacher filling in for her was hired on a full­
time basis.
B
On January 12, 2009, Johnson filed a complaint against the 
Board in state court alleging statutory and constitutional due
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process violations, breach of contract, and disability discrimi­
nation in violation of the Idaho Human Rights Act (“IHRA”), 
Idaho Code § 67-5909; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 
U.S.C. § 701 et seq.; and the Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The Board 
removed the action to the district court, which entered sum­
mary judgment in the Board’s favor. This timely appeal fol­
lowed.
II
The sole claims remaining on appeal are the disability- 
discrimination claims.1 Johnson contends that the district 
court erred in concluding that she was not a “qualified indi­
vidual with a disability” within the meaning of the ADA.
A
[1] Title I of the ADA prohibits “discrimination] against 
a qualified individual with a disability because of the disabil­
ity of such individual in regard to . . . the hiring, advance­
ment, or discharge of employees.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) 
(2007).1 2 Thus, to prevail on her disability-discrimination 
claims, Johnson “first must show that she is a ‘qualified indi­
vidual with a disability.’ ”3 Fredenburg v. Contra Costa Cnty.
1 Johnson does not contest the district court’s conclusion that her ADA 
claim is barred because she failed timely to file a charge with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission. Hence, we consider only her 
Rehabilitation Act and iHRA claims, though we construe such claims as 
we would an ADA claim. See Boose v. Tri-Cnty. Metro. Transp. Dist. o f 
Or., 587 F.3d 997, 1001 n.5 (9th Cir. 2009); Stansbury v. Blue Cross o f 
Idaho Health Serv., Inc., 918 P.2d 266, 269 (Idaho 1996).
2The ADA was amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 
(“AD AAA”), Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). Because the 
ADAAA’s effective date is January 1, 2009, 122 stat. at 3559, and 
because we have determined that the AD AAA lacks retroactive effect, 
Beccerril v. Pima Cnty. Assessor’s Office, 587 F.3d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 
2009) (per curiam), we rely on the version of the ADA in effect in 2007.
3For purposes of summary judgment, the Board does not contest that 
Johnson is disabled.
20880 Johnson v. B oard of Trustees
Dep’t o f Health Servs., 172 F.3d 1176, 1178 (9th Cir. 1999). 
Moreover, she must show that she was “qualified” at the time 
of the alleged discrimination.4 See Weyer v. Twentieth Cen­
tury Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000).
[2] The ADA defines “qualified individual” as “an individ­
ual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can per­
form the essential functions of the employment position that 
such individual holds or desires.”5 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), the 
agency to which Congress delegated authority to implement 
Title I of the ADA, see id. § 12116, has promulgated a regula­
tion expanding this definition, see Equal Employment Oppor­
tunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 
35,735 (July 26, 1991). The EEOC regulation provides that a 
“qualified individual with a disability” is one “who satisfies 
the requisite skills, experience, education and other job- 
related requirements of the employment position such individ­
ual holds or desires, and who, with or without reasonable 
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such 
position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (emphasis added). We have 
previously adopted the EEOC’s two-step inquiry as the test 
for whether an individual is qualified within the meaning of 
the ADA. See Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 
974, 990 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
B
The Board does not contest that Johnson was physically 
and mentally capable of performing the functions of a special 45
4Here, the discrimination alleged is the Board’s refusal to apply for pro­
visional authorization, i.e., “not making reasonable accommodations to the 
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual 
with a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
5The “essential functions” of a job are defined as the “fundamental job 
duties,” not including “the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(n)(1).
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education teacher at the time it denied her request for provi­
sional authorization. The Board contends, however, that John­
son’s lack of legal authorization to teach in Idaho rendered 
her unqualified pursuant to the first step of the two-step quali­
fication inquiry. Johnson responds that we must consider rea­
sonable accommodation in determining whether she satisfied 
the job prerequisites. Because Johnson could have obtained 
legal authorization to teach had the Board granted her request 
for accommodation, she contends that she met the first step.
[3] Initially, we note that the first step of the qualification 
inquiry, unlike the second step, contains no reference to rea­
sonable accommodation. If the EEOC had intended to require 
employers to provide reasonable accommodation to ensure 
that disabled individuals can satisfy the job prerequisites, in 
addition to the essential job functions, it presumably could 
have said so in the regulation. That the EEOC declined to 
include any reference to reasonable accommodation in the 
first step suggests that such omission was deliberate. See 
Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 (1981).
Our reading is supported by the EEOC’s interpretive guid­
ance on Title I (“Guidance”). In discussing the qualification 
inquiry, the Guidance explains that “[t]he first step is to deter­
mine if the individual satisfies the prerequisites for the posi­
tion, such as possessing the appropriate educational 
background, employment experience, skills, licenses, etc.” 29 
C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. to § 1630.2(m). Hence, “the first step 
in determining whether an accountant who is a paraplegic is 
qualified for a certified public accountant (CPA) position is to 
examine the individual’s credentials to determine whether the 
individual is a licensed CPA.” Id. Absent from this discussion 
is any mention of a requirement that the employer consider 
whether the individual could become a licensed CPA with 
reasonable accommodation. 4
[4] According to another section of the Guidance, “the 
obligation to make reasonable accommodation is owed only
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to an individual with a disability who is qualified within the 
meaning of § 1630.2(m) in that he or she satisfies all the skill, 
experience, education and other job-related selection criteria.” 
29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. to § 1630.9(a). The Guidance further 
provides that “[a]n individual with a disability is ‘otherwise 
qualified’ . . . if he or she is qualified for a job, except that, 
because of the disability, he or she needs a reasonable accom­
modation to be able to perform the job’s essential functions.” 
Id. Such statements make clear that unless a disabled individ­
ual independently satisfies the job prerequisites, she is not 
“otherwise qualified,” and the employer is not obligated to 
furnish any reasonable accommodation that would enable her 
to perform the essential job functions.
The Guidance then provides the following example to illus­
trate when the duty of reasonable accommodation would be 
triggered:
For example, if a law firm requires that all incom­
ing lawyers have graduated from an accredited law 
school and have passed the bar examination, the law 
firm need not provide an accommodation to an indi­
vidual with a visual impairment who has not met 
these selection criteria. That individual is not enti­
tled to a reasonable accommodation because the 
individual is not “otherwise qualified” for the posi­
tion.
on  the other hand, if the individual has graduated 
from an accredited law school and passed the bar 
examination, the individual would be “otherwise 
qualified.” The law firm would thus be required to 
provide a reasonable accommodation, such as a 
machine that magnifies print, to enable the individ­
ual to perform the essential functions of the attorney 
position, unless the necessary accommodation would 
impose an undue hardship on the law firm.
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Id. (emphasis added). Again, the Guidance explicitly dis­
claims any requirement of providing reasonable accommoda­
tion to disabled individuals who fail to meet the job
prerequisites on their own.6
C
The EEoC as amicus curiae points out that a different sec­
tion of the Guidance provides that “selection criteria that are 
related to an essential function of the job may not be used to 
exclude an individual with a disability if that individual could 
satisfy the criteria with the provision o f a reasonable accom­
modation.” 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. to § 1630.10 (emphasis 
added). Thus, the EEoC asserts that reasonable accommoda­
tion must be considered under the first step of the qualifica­
tion inquiry.7
The Guidance section cited by the EEoC pertains to chal­
lenges to “qualification standards, employment tests or other
6 Johnson concedes that an individual who cannot satisfy the job prereq­
uisites is generally not “qualified” under the first step of the qualification 
inquiry but contends that an exception exists “where the employer exer­
cises significant control over an individual's ability to obtain job-related 
qualifications.” We disagree. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Reason­
able Accommodation and undue Hardship under the Americans with Dis­
abilities Act, No. 915.002 (Oct. 17, 2002), at 20 (“There is no obligation 
for the employer to assist the individual to become qualified. Thus, the 
employer does not have to provide training so that the employee acquires 
necessary skills to take a job.” ); see also Williams v. United Ins. Co. o f 
Am., 253 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that an employer is not 
required to provide a disabled individual “training that will equip her with 
the qualifications for the job . . . that at present she lacks”).
7our dissenting colleague suggests that we have not afforded sufficient 
deference to the EEOC’s statutory and regulatory interpretations. We dis­
agree. In fact, our conclusion rests on the EEOC’s own regulation and 
interpretive guidance. See supra. We part ways on certain aspects of the 
EEOC’s litigation position only to the extent that they are off point (as 
when the EEOC invokes guidance that is irrelevant on this record) or at 
odds with the plain text of the regulation and interpretive guidance.
20884 Johnson v. B oard of Trustees
selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an indi­
vidual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabili­
ties.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.10. We 
have previously observed, in the context of a challenge to an 
employer’s “facially discriminatory qualification standard,” 
that “it would make little sense to require an ADA plaintiff to 
show that he meets a qualification standard that he undis­
putedly cannot meet because of his disability and that forms 
the very basis of his discrimination challenge.” Bates, 533 
F.3d at 988, 990. If the employee succeeds in showing that the 
qualification standard ‘has the effect of discriminating on the 
basis of disability,” the burden then shifts to the employer to 
show that “the qualification standard is (1) ‘job-related,’ (2) 
‘consistent with business necessity,’ and (3) that ‘performance 
cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation.’ ” Id. 
at 994-95 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)).
Here, however, Johnson does not challenge the Board’s 
legal authorization requirement as a discriminatory job pre­
requisite. Rather, the basis for Johnson’s discrimination claim 
is the Board’s failure to accommodate her disability, which is 
analytically distinct from a claim of disparate treatment or 
impact under the ADA. See McGary v. City o f Portland, 386 
F.3d 1259, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 2004). Because Johnson does 
not allege, let alone show, that the Board’s requirement was 
discriminatory in effect, the Guidance section pertaining to 
discriminatory qualification standards is inapposite.8
III
[5] In sum, an individual who fails to satisfy the job pre­
requisites cannot be considered “qualified” within the mean­
ing of the ADA unless she shows that the prerequisite is itself
8Accordingly, we reject Johnson’s reliance on cases such as Bates and 
Rohr v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District, 
555 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2009), both of which involved challenges to dis­
criminatory qualification standards under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6).
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discriminatory in effect. Otherwise, the default rule remains 
that “the obligation to make reasonable accommodation is 
owed only to an individual with a disability who . . . satisfies 
all the skill, experience, education and other job-related selec­
tion criteria.” 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. to § 1630.9(a). 
Because Johnson does not allege that the Board's legal autho­
rization requirement was itself discriminatory, her failure to 
satisfy such requirement rendered her unqualified, and the 
Board was not required to accommodate her disability.9
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
PAEZ, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part:
I concur in the judgment and in Parts I and II(A) of the 
majority opinion. At the time of the alleged discrimination, 
Patricia Johnson did not possess the required certification to 
be employed as a special education teacher by the Boundary 
County school District (the “District”). The accommodation 
that she sought—provisional authorization for the District to 
hire an uncertified teacher—is an accommodation to a local 
school district wholly within the discretion of the Idaho state 
Board of Education. The District did not have the authority to 
grant provisional authorization, and therefore could not grant 
Johnson the accommodation she requested. The district court 
properly granted summary judgment to the District.
We therefore need not decide whether the Equal Employ­
ment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has properly inter­
preted its own regulation to include a duty of reasonable 
accommodation in the first step of the inquiry into whether a
9In light of our conclusion, we need not consider the Board’s argument 
that the requested accommodation was unreasonable.
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person is a “qualified individual” under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”).1 See 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(m) (inter­
preting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) of the ADA). The majority, 
however, proceeds to give its own interpretation of section 
1630.2(m) and rejects the reasonable position of the EEOC. 
Because the majority does not afford the requisite deference 
due to the EEOC’s interpretation of its own regulations, I can­
not agree with Parts II(B), II(C), and III of Judge 
O’Scannlain’s opinion.
I.
At the heart of this appeal is the Idaho state Board of Edu­
cation’s procedure for a school district to obtain provisional 
authorization to hire an uncertified teacher. The Board of 
Education is vested with the authority to issue teaching certif­
icates, which it delegates to the state Department of Educa­
tion. Idaho Admin. Code 08.02.02.016. At the time Johnson 
requested a waiver of certification, the Board had created a 
procedure through which local school districts could obtain 
provisional authorization to hire uncertified teachers.2 To 
apply for authorization, a school district is required to submit 
a letter with a statement explaining the need for the request, 
detailing the qualifications of the individual the district seeks 
to hire, and “outlining the ‘good faith effort’ the district made 
in attempting to hire someone with appropriate certification.” 
The provisional authorization is valid for only one year, is
1 Johnson’s claim under the ADA was properly dismissed by the district 
court. This appeal concerns Johnson’s claims under the Idaho Human 
Rights Act (“iHRA”), Idaho Code § 67-5909, and the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. We analyze claims under the IHRA and 
Rehabilitation Act, however, as we would a claim under the ADA. See 
Zukle v. Regents o f Univ. o f Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 n.11 (9th Cir. 
1999); Stansbury v. Blue Cross o f Idaho Health Serv., Inc., 918 P.2d 266, 
269 (Idaho 1996).
2See Idaho State Bd. o f Educ. Summary o f Alternative Authoriza- 
tion/Routes to Certification, available at http://www.sde.idaho.gov/site/ 
teacher certification/alt routes.htm.
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non-renewable, and the teacher hired must obtain proper certi­
fication in order to continue teaching once the authorization 
expires.
The provisional authorization thus grants authority to a 
school district to fill a vacancy with an individual who does 
not possess the required state certification, but only after it 
has been unable to find a certified teacher, having made a 
good faith effort to do so. Presumably, a capable but uncerti­
fied teacher is in many cases better than no teacher at all. The 
Board's policy makes clear, however, that provisional autho­
rization to hire an uncertified teacher is an accommodation of 
last resort to local school districts, not an accommodation to 
a teacher who does not possess the required certification. See 
Idaho State Bd. o f Educ. Summary o f Alternative Authoriza- 
tion/Routes to Certification, available at http://www.sde 
.idaho.gov/site/teacher_certification/alt_routes.htm (“[T]his 
authorization does not lead to certification, it is an emergency 
authorization available to school districts.”). The authoriza­
tion process is an exception to Idaho Code § 33-1201, which 
provides that “[e]very person who is employed to serve in any 
elementary school or secondary school in the capacity of 
teacher . . . shall be required to have and to hold a certificate 
issued under authority of the state board of education.” Fur­
ther, the authorization process does not provide a school dis­
trict with the authority to waive the certification requirement 
by itself at the request of an uncertified teacher; only the 
Board may authorize provisional authorization.
In Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, the supreme Court held 
that an employer is not required under the ADA to accept a 
governmentally-approved waiver if the waiver regulation does 
not alter substantive licensing requirements. 527 U.S. 555, 
577-78 (1999) (concluding that a trucking company did not 
violate the ADA when it terminated and refused to rehire a 
visually impaired driver for failing to meet Department of 
Transportation vision acuity standards even after the driver 
obtained a waiver from the Department). That is the case here.
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The provisional authorization procedure is a limited exception 
to the state certification standards that Idaho public school 
teachers must satisfy. Although provisional authorization was 
potentially available, the District was not required to utilize 
the procedure to rehire Johnson.
This might be a different case if the District had created the 
certification requirement or if it had independent authority 
and discretion to waive the certification requirement so that it 
could rehire Johnson. Under the teacher certification scheme 
that Idaho has adopted, however, both of those responsibilities 
rest with the State Board of Education. Johnson therefore has 
no basis to complain that the District discriminated against 
her in violation of the IHRA and the Rehabilitation Act when 
it declined to seek provisional authorization from the state.
II.
There is no need to reach the question—as the majority 
does in Parts II(B) and II(C) of the opinion—of whether the 
District had a duty under the ADA to apply for provisional 
authorization to rehire Johnson as a reasonable accommoda­
tion so that she could ultimately renew her certification. In its 
Amicus Brief, the EEOC contends that the “district court 
erred in failing to ask the controlling question in granting 
defendants' motion for summary judgment: whether the plain­
tiff would have been ‘qualified’ for her teaching position if 
she had received the waiver she sought.” Here, the answer to 
the EEOC’s question is clearly “No.” As described above, the 
provisional authority, if granted, would have permitted the 
District to hire Johnson for one year despite the fact that she 
did not possess the required state certification. Even if the 
Board of Education had granted the District provisional 
authorization to hire Johnson, Johnson still would have lacked 
the certification required by section 33-1201.
Because Johnson’s claim would fail even if we accepted 
the EEOC’s formulation of the relevant legal question, I see
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no need to opine on the persuasiveness of the EEOC’s inter­
pretation of its own regulation implementing the ADA. Yet 
not only does the majority opinion do so, it quarrels with the 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulation without regard 
for the deference we must afford the EEOC. In Auer v. Rob­
bins, the Supreme Court held that where a particular test “is 
a creature of the [agency]’s own regulations, [the agency’s] 
interpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence, controlling 
unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” 
519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (internal quotations omitted); see 
also Kraus v. Presidio Trust Facilities Div./Residential Mgmt. 
Branch, 572 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2009) (deferring to 
EEOC’s interpretation of its own regulation). The Court 
explained that such deference is due even where, as here, the 
agency’s position is contained in an appellate brief, so long as 
the agency is not attempting to defend its own past actions. 
Auer, 519 U.S. at 462 (“There is simply no reason to suspect 
that the interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and 
considered judgment on the matter in question.”).
Here, the EEoC, as amicus curiae, argues that an employer 
has a duty to provide reasonable accommodation to a prospec­
tive employee if that accommodation would allow the person 
to become qualified for the position. The majority rejects the 
EEOC’s position for three reasons. First, the majority argues 
that the first part of the two-part definition of “qualified” in 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) contains no reference to reasonable 
accommodation. Maj. Op. at 20880. Second, the majority 
argues that the EEOC’s interpretive guidance, contained in 29 
C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(m), “explicitly disclaims any 
requirement of providing reasonable accommodation to dis­
abled individuals who fail to meet the job prerequisites on 
their own.” Maj. Op. at 20883. Third, the majority argues that 
the EEOC’s position is incorrect because it relies on inappli­
cable regulations and interpretive guidance governing only 
facially discriminatory selection criteria. Maj. Op. at 
20883-84. None of these arguments show that the EEOC’s 
interpretation of 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) is “plainly erroneous
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or inconsistent with the regulation” and does not reflect the 
agency’s “fair and considered judgment.” Auer, 519 U.S. at 
461-62.
It is undisputed that the first part of the EEOC’s “qualified 
individual” test, which asks whether a person “satisfies the 
requisite skills, experience, education and other job-related 
requirements of the employment position,” does not contain 
a reference to reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(m); Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 
990 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). The majority states that the 
EEOC “presumably” could have included a reference to rea­
sonable accommodation and that its failure to do so “suggests 
that such omission was deliberate.” Maj. Op. at 20881. The 
majority similarly argues that the interpretive guidance to that 
regulation, also silent as to any duty of reasonable accommo­
dation in assisting an applicant to attain “the appropriate . . . 
licenses,” 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(m), should be 
read to preclude a duty of reasonable accommodation. The 
majority’s interpretation would not be an unreasonable read­
ing of the regulation in a vacuum. There is no reason to rely 
on presumptions and inferences from omissions, however, 
because the EEOC has spoken through its Amicus Brief. See 
Auer, 519 U.S. at 462 (deferring to agency’s position as stated 
in appellate brief to the Supreme Court). I see no reason in the 
context of this case to take issue with the EEOC’s interpreta­
tion of section 1630.2.
We should avoid contradicting the EEOC when it interprets 
its own guidelines in a manner that is not plainly erroneous 
or inconsistent with the governing statute or regulation. The 
majority states that the EEOC’s interpretive guidance for sec­
tion 1630(a) “explicitly disclaims” any duty of reasonable 
accommodation to individuals who fail to meet the job pre­
requisites on their own. Maj. Op. at 20883. The majority 
points to an illustration provided by the EEOC concerning 
applicants to a law firm. In that example, the interpretive 
guidance states that a law firm has no duty to provide a rea­
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sonable accommodation to an applicant who has not yet 
passed the bar, but must provide an accommodation to an 
applicant who has successfully passed the bar. 29 C.F.R. pt. 
1630, app. § 1630.2(a). The majority interprets this example 
to mean that the law firm has no duty to provide a reasonable 
accommodation so that the applicant can become qualified for 
the position. This reads the EEOC’s guidance too broadly.
The guidance merely states that the duty to provide a rea­
sonable accommodation to an employee so that he can per­
form the essential functions of the job does not exist until the 
employee is otherwise qualified. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. 
§ 1630.2(m). This does not preclude the existence of a duty 
to assist the employee in becoming otherwise qualified if such 
assistance is a “reasonable accommodation.” Because these 
are separate questions, there is nothing in the guidance that 
“explicitly disclaims” the EEOC’s reasonable position 
expressed in its Amicus Brief.
There is also no basis for the majority’s suggestion that the 
ADA and the EEOC’s regulation exclude a duty of reasonable 
accommodation to allow an applicant to meet qualification 
standards unless those standards are facially discriminatory. 
We have no doubt declared that 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6), per­
taining to “qualification standards, employment tests or other 
selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an indi­
vidual with a disability,” applies to standards that are facially 
discriminatory against disabled persons. See Bates, 511 F.3d 
at 989. There is nothing in our prior decisions, however, pre­
cluding the EEOC’s position that section 12112(b)(6) can also 
be read to include facially neutral standards that “screen out 
an individual with a disability,” especially when an appropri­
ate waiver system is in place.
In sum, the EEOC’s position expressed in its Amicus Brief 
is not plainly erroneous, irrational, or inconsistent with either 
the ADA or the EEOC’s regulations and interpretive guid­
ance. Although the rule the majority proposes in Part III of the
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opinion is plausible, it is contrary to the reasonable view of 
the EEOC, and we ought to defer to the agency’s reasonable 
position rather than attempt to give our own interpretation to 
the EEOC’s regulation and the governing statute. Because I 
see no reason to reject the EEOC’s position that employers 
have a duty to provide reasonable accommodation to disabled 
individuals who could satisfy job prerequisites with an 
accommodation, I would defer to that position. I therefore 
respectfully dissent from Parts II(B), II(C), and III. Nonethe­
less, because the District did not have the authority to grant 
Johnson a provisional waiver to the required state certifica­
tion, I concur in the court’s judgment.
